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The emergence of new nuclear aspirants has posed a great threat to the post-Cold War global non-
proliferation regime. These states have adopted a nuclear hedging strategy that has been deemed both 
strategically risky and politically difficult to maintain. Yet, hedging has not automatically resulted in 
nuclearization. We analyze the conditions under which a nuclear hedger shifts its nuclear policy towards 
nuclear restraint. Drawing insights from prospect theory, we argue that a nuclear policy shift occurs 
when a nuclear hedger gains an asymmetric leverage vis-à-vis its adversary. That is, a hedging strategy 
that is based on loss aversion will only be abandoned when shifts in the nuclear aspirant’s reference 
point occurs during the course of negotiations. To test our theoretical arguments, we conduct an in-
depth case study of North Korea’s nuclear policies throughout the 1990s and 2000s. The empirical study 
on the changes in North Korea’s negotiating stance during the Agreed Framework negotiations and the 
Six-Party Talks supports our asymmetric leverage thesis developed in the paper. We conclude with 
broad policy implications for the non-proliferation regime.  
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Nuclear proliferation is a path fraught with various costs and political risks. Not only do most 
nuclear aspirants fail to attain nuclear weapons but many have paid the price of prohibitive 
sanctions or ran the risk of an arms race during their pursuit.1 To alleviate these costs, several 
aspirants have turned to nuclear hedging, a strategy of maintaining nuclear latency and using 
that technical means for political ends. Yet, despite the availability of material and the 
signaling of intent, hedgers do not always completely nuclearize as some eventually chose a 
course of nuclear restraint.2 Theoretical discussions and conceptual articulation on this link 
between the nuclear hedging strategy and restraining behavior in the broader framework of 
nuclear reversals (or rollbacks) have only recently started to garner interest,3 but it is 
important given that nuclear hedging is likely to be a more common threat to the non-
proliferation regime in the future.4 
 
At the heart of post-Cold War threats to the non-proliferation regime is North Korea, a 
nuclear aspirant that has unambiguously adopted a hedging strategy over the past two 
                                                          
1 Nuclear aspirants, broadly, are states that have ‘considered, developed, abandoned, or acquired nuclear 
weapons programs’, especially after the establishment of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Etel Solingen, 
Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2007), p. 3. On the cases and costs of proliferation, see Thomas Juneau and Sam Razavi, ‘Costly Gains: A Cost-
Benefit Assessment of Iran’s Nuclear Program’, The Nonproliferation Review, 25:1-2 (2018), pp. 69-86; Robert 
Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1989), p. 3; Nicholas L. Miller, ‘The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions’, 
International Organization, 68:4 (2014), pp. 913-44; Vipin Narang, ‘Strategies of Nuclear Proliferation: How 
States Pursue the Bomb’, International Security, 41:3 (2016/17), p. 120; and Ariel E. Levite, ‘Never Say Never 
Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited’, International Security, 27:3 (2002/03), p. 62.  
2 Some examples from the Cold War period include Taiwan and South Korea. While neither completely 
dismantled their facilities to the point that it is impossible to weaponize their programs today, both rolled back 
their capabilities under US pressure in the 1970s and 80s. See Rebecca K. C. Hersman and Robert Peters, 
‘Nuclear U-Turns’, The Nonproliferation Review, 13:3 (2006), pp. 546-9. 
3 For a review of works criticizing the tendency to study nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation as separate 
issues, see Tristan A. Volpe, ‘Atomic Leverage: Compellence with Nuclear Latency’, Security Studies, 26:3 
(2017), p. 519.  
4 Ches Thurber, ‘A Step Short of the Bomb: Explaining the Strategy of Nuclear Hedging’, Journal of Public and 
International Affairs 2 (2011), p. 46; and Robert J. Einhorn, ‘Identifying Nuclear Aspirants and their Pathways 




decades.5 Even as the latest rounds of Trump-Kim negotiations proceed, experts continue to 
observe construction or ‘other maintenance related activity’ at key nuclear facilities,6 and 
over the past year, North Korea ‘may [even] have produced enough… to add as many as 
seven nuclear weapons to its arsenal’.7 The latest iteration of the US-DPRK (Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea) negotiations to deal with the North Korean nuclear threat has 
been roundly criticized within the scholarly and policy circles.8 Pessimists argue that recent 
negotiations achieved too little while conceding more to Pyongyang than in previous 
negotiations, while others question the sincerity of North Korea’s diplomatic stance.9 Yet, 
despite the increase in the number of nuclear tests and military provocations under the Kim 
Jong-un regime over the past few years,10 North Korea has displayed considerable variation 
in its nuclear policy, showing an inclination to restrain its nuclear weapons program on 
several occasions. Such patterns of nuclear restraint have continued in the current round of 
US-DPRK negotiations, for instance, when Pyongyang announced a moratorium on its 
nuclear weapons tests and its intercontinental ballistic missile launches in the lead-up to the 
                                                          
5 ‘North Korea’s Weapons Programs’, Council on Foreign Relations, available at: 
{https://www.cfr.org/event/north-koreas-weapons-programs}, accessed 15 April, 2019. 
6 Jeffrey Lewis and Dave Schmerler, ‘North Korean Missile Base at Yeongjeo-dong’, Arms Control Wonk, 
available at: {https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1206442/north-korean-missile-base-at-yeongjeo-
dong/}, accessed 13 April, 2019; and Frank V. Pabian and Jack Liu, ‘North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear 
Scientific Research Center: Crane Seen at the Experimental Light Water Reactor’, 38 North, available at: 
{https://www.38north.org/2019/04/yongbyon040519/}, accessed 13 April, 2019. 
7 David Brunnstrom, ‘North Korea May Have Made More Nuclear Bombs, but Threat Reduced: Study’, 
Reuters, available at: {https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-usa-nuclear-study/north-korea-may-have-
made-more-nuclear-bombs-but-threat-reduced-study-idUSKCN1Q10EL}, accessed 13 April, 2019. 
8 For an overview, see Leon V. Sigal, ‘Breaking the News Frame of Trump’s nuclear Diplomacy’, 38 North, 
available at: {https://www.38north.org/2018/06/lsigal062118/}, accessed 13 April, 2019. 
9 For example, Olivia Enos, ‘After Failed Summit in Hanoi: Where Do We Go From Here?’ The Heritage 
Foundation, available at: {https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/after-failed-summit-hanoi-where-do-we-
go-here}, accessed 15 April, 2019; Dennis P. Halpin, ‘Almost a Month On, What did the Singapore Summit 
Achieve?’ NK News, available at: {https://www.nknews.org/2018/07/almost-a-month-on-what-did-the-
singapore-summit-achieve/}, accessed 15 April. 2019; Jonathan Marcus, ‘Trump Kim Summit: What Did it 
Actually Achieve?’ BBC, available at: {https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-44484322}, accessed 15 
April, 2019; and Daniel R. Russel, ‘A Historic Breakthrough or a Historic Blunder in Singapore?’ Foreign 
Affairs, available at: {https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2018-06-12/historic-breakthrough-or-
historic-blunder-singapore}, accessed 15 April. 2019. 
10 Joshua Berlinger and Hilary Whiteman, ‘The Pledge to Halt Missile Tests Comes After a Busy Year of 
Launches by North Korea’, CNN, available at: {https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/06/asia/north-korea-missile-tests-




Trump-Kim Summit, and dismantled ‘key facilities’ as a part of its ‘confidence building 
measure’ more recently.11 Notwithstanding the potential expansion of its nuclear arsenal, 
such acts of restraint ultimately ‘markedly reduced’ Pyongyang’s threat to the US.12 ‘When 
they ended missile testing, [weaponization capabilities] rolled backwards. So when I look at 
the whole spectrum,’ Siegfried Hecker points out, ‘North Korea… is less dangerous today 
than it was at the end of 2017, in spite of the fact that they may have made another five to 
seven weapons worth of nuclear material’.13  
 
Under what conditions do nuclear hedging states adopt a policy of nuclear restraint? In this 
article, we examine the causes of nuclear restraint and analyze the process through which it 
occurs in the international system. We argue that an aspirant decides to enter the nuclear 
reversal pathway or, at minimum, temporarily agrees to restrain its nuclear policy due to 
asymmetric leveraging. Asymmetric occurs under two interrelated conditions: 1) when a 
nuclear hedger perceives its adversary shouldering relatively higher costs; and 2) when it is 
confident about attaining gains should a deal materialize. Drawing insights from prospect 
theory, we argue that asymmetric leveraging motivates restraint because of loss aversion. 
Specifically, a loss-averse hedger would undertake changes to its nuclear policy when its 
reference point changes. As such, we expect that when the adversary concedes first to meet 
the aspirant’s central demands, its reference point would shift from one centered on 
defending its nuclear program to protecting these potential gains. Following which, the 
                                                          
11 Justin McCurry, ‘North Korea Halts Nuclear and Missile Tests ahead of Planned Trump Summit,’ The 
Guardian, available at: {https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/20/north-korea-suspends-nuclear-
missile-tests}, accessed 26 July, 2018; and ‘North Korea Begins Dismantling Key Facilities at the Sohae 
Satellite Launching Station’, 38 North, available at: {https://www.38north.org/2018/07/sohae072318/}, 
accessed 26 July, 2018. 
12 Siegfried S. Hecker, ‘Why Insisting on a North Korea Nuclear Declaration Up Front is a Big Mistake’, 38 
North, available at: {https://www.38north.org/2018/11/shecker112818/}, accessed 13 April, 2019. 




aspirant then makes the explicit commitments demonstrating changes in its nuclear policy 
from proliferation to restraint. 
 
Theoretically, by focusing on the policy of restraint, our asymmetric leverage argument 
contributes to the nuclear nonproliferation literature by analyzing the causal pathway through 
which aspirants may at minimum initiate the process of nuclear reversal.14 While nuclear 
restraint may be taken as a suboptimal outcome to rollback, it may be the next best alternative 
available given the difficulties associated with a full reversal. From a policy perspective, our 
argument is somewhat counterintuitive and goes against the general diplomatic stance of the 
US and the approach of the international community towards rogue regimes in the post-Cold 
War period.15 Oftentimes negotiating with nuclear aspirants has been regarded as a form of 
‘appeasement’, with potential nonproliferation options criticized as ‘rewarding bad 
behavior’.16 In contrast, we argue that the most viable way to put an aspirant on a reversal 
pathway is by allowing it to fulfil its core interests at the bargaining table. This applies to 
North Korea in the current context. As Robert Carlin succinctly notes in his 2010 testimony 
to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, North Korea will ‘abide by the core of [a 
thoughtfully constructed and implemented agreement]’ although ‘they are likely to game the 
process, exploiting ambiguities and hedging their bets’ in the process.17 
                                                          
14 Among others, see Scott D. Sagan, ‘Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a 
Bomb’, International Security, 21:3 (1996/1997), p. 63; Nicholas L. Miller, ‘Nuclear Dominoes: A Self-
Defeating Prophecy?’ Security Studies, 23:1 (2014), pp. 33-73; 2014; Jacques E. C. Hymans, The Psychology of 
Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions and Foreign Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); 
Solingen, Nuclear Logics; Maria Rost Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint 
(Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2009); William Spaniel, Bargaining over the Bomb: The Successes 
and Failures of Nuclear Negotiations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019); and Levite, ‘Never Say 
Never Again’. 
15 Geoffrey Wiseman, ‘Introduction’, in Geoffrey Wiseman (ed.), Isolate or Engage: Adversarial States, US 
Foreign Policy and Public Diplomacy (Stanford: Stanford University Press), p. 3 
16 Fred Kaplan, ‘Rolling Blunder: How the Bush Administration Let North Korea Get Nukes’, Washington 
Monthly, available at: {http://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/may-2004/rolling-blunder-2/}, accessed 13 
July, 2018; and Robert McMahon, ‘Negotiating with Hostile States’, Council of Foreign Relations, available at: 
{https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/negotiating-hostile-states}, accessed 13 July, 2018. 
17 United States Senate, ‘Testimony of Robert Carlin Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’, available 





The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In the next section, we first 
conceptualize nuclear hedging strategy and make the case that nuclear behavior should be 
considered as a continuum rather than a dichotomy. We then develop and elaborate on the 
asymmetric leverage argument within the nuclear proliferation continuum in detail. In the 
following section, we test the theoretical arguments developed by conducting an in-depth 
case study of North Korea’s nuclear policies during the 1994 Agreed Framework negotiations 
and the Six-Party Talks. The final section concludes with broad theoretical and policy 
implications for the future of non-proliferation in the post-Cold War era. 
 
Nuclear Hedging and the Proliferation Continuum 
It is argued that nuclear proliferation in the post-Cold War era is more of an exception than 
the rule.18 Yet, notwithstanding the exclusiveness of the nuclear club and the broad support 
for the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the history of nuclear hedging and other 
weaponization strategies, 26 and 21 instances respectively,19 suggests that states’ desire to 
own or at least to have the capability to develop nuclear weapons is not yet forgone.20 
Moreover, while not prohibited by the NPT, latent capabilities concern the non-proliferation 
regime because advanced nuclear technologies ‘could result in strategic surprise’ should 
states decide to go nuclear.21 Still, in contrast to the scholarly attention devoted to the causes 
                                                          
18 Jacques E.C. Hymans, ‘The Threat of Nuclear Proliferation: Perception and Reality’, Ethics & International 
Affairs 27:3 (2013), pp. 281-98.  
19 Narang, ‘Strategies of Nuclear Proliferation’, p. 137. For a discussion on the challenges to and successes of 
the non-proliferation regime, see William C. Potter, ‘The NPT & the Sources of Nuclear Restraint,’ Daedalus, 
139:1 (2010), pp. 68-81. 
20 T. V. Paul, Power versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2000), p. 57; and Avner Cohen and Benjamin Frankel, ‘Opaque Nuclear 
Proliferation’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 13:3 (1990), pp. 14-44.  
21 Joseph F. Pilat, ‘Report of a Workshop on Nuclear Latency’, Report presented at the Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars, available at: {https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Report--
Workshop%20on%20Nuclear%20Latency--20141002.pdf}, accessed 3 May, 2018. For recent discussions, see 
Matthew Kroenig, ‘Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance’, American Political 




of nuclear pursuit, the strategic decision undertaken by states, such as nuclear hedging, 
remains conceptually vague and theoretically underspecified within the proliferation 
literature.22 We first begin by unpacking the different concepts of the proliferation 
continuum.  
 
Nuclear hedging is a state strategy where an aspirant maintains ‘a viable option for the 
relatively rapid acquisition of nuclear weapons, based on an indigenous technical capacity’.23 
Depending on the aspirant’s technological state for nuclear weapons acquisition, a variety of 
hedging strategies exists ranging from technical to hard hedging.24 Two key features underpin 
the strategy, one technical and the other political. The first is nuclear latency, advanced 
technological capabilities that are steps away from weaponizing a state’s nuclear program.25 
While states may possess varying levels of latency, this aspect carries threat potential because 
it facilitates nuclear weapons acquisition should the state choose to do so.26 Furthermore, 
nuclear hedging strategy equally applies to states that have yet to develop the ‘technological 
                                                          
Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements’, International Security, 34:1 (2009), pp. 7-41; and Nicholas L. 
Miller, ‘Why Nuclear Energy Programs Rarely Lead to Proliferation’, International Security, 42:2 (2017), pp. 
40-77. 
22 According to Wyn Bowen and Matthew Moran, ‘the fact that the concept is regularly described in political 
and diplomatic discourse without mention of the specific term “hedging” is perhaps indicative of a certain 
confusion with regard to… proliferation behaviour. This vocabulary comprises a number of overlapping terms 
and concepts … that are frequently used interchangeably and without discrimination.’ Wyn Bowen and Matthew 
Moran, ‘Iran’s Nuclear Programme: A Case in Hedging?’ Contemporary Security Policy 35:1 (2014), p. 27. 
Also, see Mark Fitzpatrick, ‘Nuclear Latency with an Attitude’, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
available at: {http://www.iiss.org/en/politics%20and%20strategy/blogsections/2014-d2de/october-931b/nuclear-
latency-c8a6} accessed 18 June, 2018.  
23 Levite, ‘Never Say Never Again’, p. 69; and Narang, ‘Strategies of Nuclear Proliferation’, pp. 117-20. Also, 
see Mitchell Reiss, ‘The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices’, in Kurt M. 
Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn and Mitchell B. Reiss (eds.), The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider 
their Nuclear Choices (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2004), pp. 3-17.  
24 Narang, ‘Strategies of Nuclear Proliferation’, pp. 117-20.  
25 Matthew Fuhrmann and Benjamin Tkach, ‘Almost Nuclear: Introducing the Nuclear Latency Dataset’, 
Conflict Management and Peace Science, 32:4 (2015), pp. 443-61; Pilat, ‘Report of a Workshop on Nuclear 
Latency’; Rupal N. Mehta and Rachel Elizabeth Whitlark, ‘The Benefits and Burdens of Nuclear Latency’, 
International Studies Quarterly, 61:3 (2017), pp. 517-28; and Scott D. Sagan, ‘Nuclear Latency and Nuclear 
Proliferation’, in William C. Potter with Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova (eds), Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in 
the 21st Century: The Role of Theory (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), pp. 80-101. 




requirements… [that meet] a state’s nuclear posture’.27 The second relates to a state’s 
deliberate decision to leverage the threat potential to achieve political objectives, i.e., hedging 
is a political strategy.28 Israel and South Africa, for instance, have hedged through the opaque 
development of their nuclear weapons to avoid abandonment by their nuclear allies while 
maintaining ‘an important deterrent of major psychological value’.29 At the same time, they 
would provide assurances and threats to get the US, in particular, to remain engaged or 
provide materials that further advanced their nuclear research and development. 
 
As a strategy that lies ‘between nuclear pursuit and nuclear rollback’, hedging is conceptually 
distinct from the policy of nuclear restraint.30 Nuclear restraint is a policy (or an external 
commitment) undertaken by the aspirant that ‘at least initially, falls short of nuclear rollback 
but nonetheless keeps it from proceeding with some prominent nuclear activities’ pertaining 
to its nuclear posture.31 Nuclear restraint can be conceptualized by the notion of a ‘red line’ – 
a policy tool ‘meant to influence-usually to constraint- the actions of another actor… [and] 
                                                          
27 As Mark Bell points out the point of nuclear acquisition is “defined as the point at which the state acquires the 
technological capability to use nuclear weapons in the way the state envisages using them’. Mark S. Bell, 
‘Beyond Emboldenment: How Acquiring Nuclear Weapon Can Change Foreign Policy’, International Security, 
40:1 (2015), p. 92; and Mark S. Bell, ‘Nuclear Opportunism: A theory of how states use nuclear weapons in 
international politics’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 42:1 (2019), p. 10. North Korea still does not possess the 
required reentry technologies for its ICBMs to strike US mainland, assuming that is its goal for developing 
nuclear weapons. For more on the state of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, see Hans M. Kristensen and 
Robert S. Norris, ‘North Korean nuclear capabilities, 2018’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 74:1 (2018), pp. 
46-8. 
28 Levite, ‘Never Say Never Again’, pp. 66, 72; Bowen and Moran, ‘Iran’s Nuclear Programme’, pp. 30-1; and 
Narang, ‘Strategies of Nuclear Proliferation’, p. 117 (fn. 20). By threat potential, we do not mean that the 
program is developed merely as a tool to negotiate with the great powers; in fact, few aspirants have proliferated 
simply to do so. See Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1990), p. 347. 
29 Or Rabinowitz and Nicholas L. Miller, ‘Keeping the Bombs in the Basement: U.S. Nonproliferation Policy 
toward Israel, South Africa, and Pakistan’, International Security, 40:1 (2015), pp. 51, 68; Frank V. Pabian, 
“The South African Denuclearization Exemplar: Insights for Nonproliferation Monitoring and Verification', 
Nonproliferation Review, 22:1 (2015), pp. 27-52;68, and Mitsuru Kitano, ‘Opaque Nuclear Proliferation 
Revisited: Determinants, Dynamism, and Policy Implications’, Nonproliferation Review, 23:4 (2016), pp. 459-
79. 
30 Levite, ‘Never Say Never Again’, p. 59. 
31 ‘Such restraint typically pertains to refraining from the construction of certain facilities; the production (of 
certain or all fissionable materials), testing, assembly, or deployment of weapons; or proclamations of nuclear 




distinguishes acceptable actions from unacceptable actions’.32 In this context, a nuclear 
hedger would be maintaining a policy of restraint insofar as it stays within the red line that is 
laid down by itself or other actors as the building block for the initiations or continuation of 
interactions. Relating to the ongoing US-DPRK negotiations, the, one red line which US 
Senator Lindsey Graham identified is North Korea’s ‘testing [of] another warhead on an 
intercontinental ballistic missile’, which Pyongyang has not violated since 2018.33  
 
Owing to the conceptual distinction, nuclear hedging behavior may be observed even after a 
state decides to shift its nuclear proliferation (or non-proliferation) policy from one to 
another: hedging strategy ‘may be adopted either during the process of developing a bomb or 
as part of the rollback process, as a way of retaining the option of restarting a weapons 
program that has been halted or reversed’.34 That states would continue to hedge in spite of 
its commitment toward restraint should not be surprising since hedging can serve to limit 
risks or maximize bargaining leverage, or both.35 Having clarified the definitions of the key 
concepts in this paper, we join other scholars in disaggregating the existing binary view of 
nuclear proliferation,36 and re-conceptualize the three concepts as follows: 
 
                                                          
32 Dan Altman and Nicholas L. Miller, ‘Red Lines in Nuclear Nonproliferation’, Nonproliferation Review, 24:3-
4 (2017), p. 317. 
33 John Grady, ‘Graham: Only a ‘Matter of Time’ before North Korea Crosses a Red Line’, U.S. Naval Institute, 
available at: {https://news.usni.org/2018/01/17/graham-matter-time-north-korea-crosses-red-line}, accessed 5 
April, 2019 ; and Michael Elleman, ‘Why a Formal End to North Korean Missile Testing Makes Sense’, 38 
North, available at: {https://www.38north.org/2019/02/melleman022619/}, accessed 5 April, 2019. 
34 Following Levite, we adopt a broad definition of nuclear hedging. Levite, ‘Never Say Never Again’, p. 70. 
35 Nuclear reversal may be ‘fraught with political risks’ due to the need ‘to address the security, prestige, and 
bureaucratic appeal of a nuclear program’. Hence, nuclear reversal hardly progresses immediately towards 
rollback or proceeds in a smooth linear manner since states must manage domestic resistance and other risks 
associated with it. Levite, ‘Never Say Never Again’, pp. 67, 74-5. For more examples on how states have used 
hedging or the like to minimize risks or maximize leverage, see Hersman and Peters, ‘Nuclear U-Turns’, pp. 
539-53; and Volpe, ‘Atomic Leverage’, pp. 517-44. 
36 Volpe, ‘Atomic Leverage’, p. 519; Sonali Singh and Christopher R. Way, ‘The Correlates of Nuclear 
Proliferation: A Quantitative Test’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48:6 (2004), pp. 865-7; Vipin Narang, 
Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2014), p. 299; and Wyn Bowen, Matthew Moran and Dina Esfandiary, Living on the Edge: 




<Insert Figure 1 Here> 
 
Existing scholarship offers two insights on why states adopt the nuclear hedging strategy. 
First, hedging provides aspirants with the capability to deter adversaries or compel 
concessions, or both. States with security concerns could hedge, for instance, to guard against 
the lack of assurances accorded by alternative security arrangements. In the 1970s, South 
Korea, for example, continued advancing its nuclear program despite acceding to US pressure 
to denuclearize because it could not be sure that the US would maintain its extended 
deterrence in the Korean peninsula.37 By creating the impression that one has advanced 
technology, states, such as Italy, have also hedged in the 1950s in order to demand greater 
security protection as a condition for abandoning their indigenous nuclear weapons 
program.38  
  
Secondly, nuclear aspirants have reasons to espouse rhetoric and gain buy-in from domestic 
constituents because popular support is often needed when undertaking huge investments like 
nuclear development. Domestic support for a nuclear program, however, does not necessarily 
imply support for a nuclear weapons program. Hence, states might be handicapped by their 
own rhetoric, such that while they are able to justify progress in terms of nuclear latency, they 
are unable to exercise the option of weaponization. In this case, hedging could become ‘the 
only approach that allows the regime to reconcile any potential moves towards nuclear 
weapons with the consensus on nuclear advancement that the broader nuclear narrative has 
facilitated’.39 
                                                          
37 Hersman and Peters, ‘Nuclear U-Turns’, pp. 541-2. Also, Gene Gerzhoy, ‘Alliance Coercion and Nuclear 
Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany’s Nuclear Ambitions’, International Security, 39:4 
(2015), pp. 91-129. 
38 Levite, ‘Never Say Never Again,’ p. 66. 





In short, motivations for adopting the hedging strategy are broadly understood to be driven 
either by international or domestic reasons. However, if nuclear hedging reveals, by 
definition, the desire to keep the re-nuclearization option open, then such states are also more 
likely to be particularly sensitive to losses.40 Derived from prospect theory,41 loss aversion 
describes one’s tendency to ‘overvalue losses relative to comparable gains’.42 Centered on a 
given reference point, loss aversion implies that the value function in the loss domain tends to 
be stepper than the gain side for a given state.43 A loss-averse state would rather retain 
something it owns than to give it up for something new, even if the latter is of the same value 
(“endowment effect”).44 As such, reaching a negotiated settlement ‘is more difficult than 
expected-utility predicts because people overweight what they concede in bargaining relative 
to what they get in return’.45 Moreover, loss-averse behavior may persist with changes in the 
initial reference point if unrealized expectations are regarded as losses.46 
 
Such inclination towards maintaining one’s possession becomes even more pronounced when 
the costs of the nuclear hedging strategy are considered (“sunk cost fallacy”). States 
                                                          
40 Given that we adopt a broad definition of hedging, we acknowledge that there are other causal pathways to 
nuclear restraint. We identify a key causal pathway that is in accordance to loss aversion. 
41 On prospect theory, see Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, ‘Choices, Values and Frames’, American 
Psychologist, 39:4 (1984), pp. 341-50; and Jonathan Mercer, ‘Prospect Theory and Political Science’, Annual 
Review of Political Science, 8 (2005), pp. 1-12. On some recent application of prospect theory to international 
relations, see Rose McDermott, Risk-Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign 
Policy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998); David A. Welch, Painful Choices: A Theory of 
Foreign Policy Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), chapters 2-3; Jeffrey D. Berejikian and 
Bryan R. Early, ‘Loss Aversion and Foreign Policy Resolve’, Political Psychology, 34:5 (2013), pp. 649-71; 
and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2004). 
42 Jack S. Levy, ‘Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations’, International Studies 
Quarterly, 41:1 (1997), p. 89; and McDermott, Risk-Taking in International Politics, pp. 27-9. 
43 Jack S. Levy, ‘Applications of Prospect Theory to Political Science’, Synthese, 135:2 (2003), p. 235. 
44 Jack S. Levy, ‘Loss Aversion, Framing Effects, and International Conflict: Perspectives from Prospect 
Theory’, in Manus I. Midlarsky (ed.), Handbook of War Studies II (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
2000), p. 195. 
45 Jack S. Levy, ‘Psychology and Foreign Policy Decision-Making’, in Leonie Huddy, David Sears, and Jack 
Levy (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 
pp. 315-6. 




developing nuclear weapon capabilities may account for inadvertent nuclear accidents or 
wars, potential regional nuclear arms racing, and political and technological costs imposed by 
the strengthening of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and the international community.47 
As such, loss-averse states engaging in nuclear hedging should have had undergone 
substantial ‘duress’ in the process, which would cause policy changes to make little logical 
sense and commitments to reversal even more difficult.48 Yet, Iran’s recent agreement to the 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and North Korea’s brief abidance by the 1994 
Agreed Framework demonstrate that policy shift towards restraint is possible even in the 
hardest cases of nuclear hedging. To resolve this puzzle, we propose a set of conditions 
which we term as asymmetric leveraging to explain the otherwise inconsistent shift in nuclear 
policy by nuclear hedgers. 
 
Asymmetric Leverage and Nuclear Restraint 
A leverage in a bargain is conceptually identified by its relative costs: ‘the more it costs Party 
B not to have an agreement with Party A, the more leverage Party A has’.49 Given that we do 
not expect a nuclear hedger to be easily enticed by inducements, we expect it would take 
more for a hedger to eventually accept an agreement. Nuclear restraint due to asymmetric 
leveraging thus occurs under two interrelated conditions: 1) when a nuclear hedger perceives 
its adversary’s cost to exceed its own; and 2) is confident about attaining gains should it 
cooperate toward their materialization. Once the reference point has shifted towards these 
potential gains and the nuclear hedger again operates in a realm of loss, what underpins the 
two conditions is loss aversion. A change in nuclear policy is therefore encouraged as a loss-
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averse nuclear hedger shifts its reference point from defending its nuclear weapons program 
to preserving the potential gains of a successful deal.50 
 
We begin by elaborating the first condition. If nuclear hedging most often occur when states 
undergo duress,51 the risks of committing to and making concessions would expectedly be 
high.52 Given the stakes, the adversary must therefore first incur costs signaling its 
commitment (or ‘irrevocable commitment’) towards a successful negotiation for the 
aspirant’s reference point to begin shifting away from deterrence.53 ‘Disarming gestures’ like 
the respectful exchanges between Donald Trump and Kin Jong-un communicate a change on 
the adversary’s part, which could soften, to some degree, the aspirant’s insistence on holding 
on to its initial reference point.54  
 
However, as mentioned, loss-averse nuclear hedgers should not be expected to shift reference 
points easily. Hence, following preliminary shifts in its adversary’s posture, we would expect 
the aspirant to evaluate the magnitude of change in its adversary’s position which, in the 
context of negotiations, refers to the assessment of its willingness to also meet the hedger’s 
central demands. Leverage in this sense becomes asymmetric because the adversary (often a 
more powerful state that has the means and interest to counter nuclear proliferation) is 
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regarded as having less bargaining power than the weaker aspirant. Once these demands are 
agreed to and the reference point shifts, the aspirant would then work towards maintaining 
this newly gained leverage and the attainment of demands even if it meant freezing its own 
nuclear deterrent capabilities.55 The impression that the Trump-Kim summits serve ‘as a 
“victory” for North Korea’ and the extent to which the summits led Kim Jong-un to expect an 
‘exchange skewed largely in his regime’s favor’ exemplify precisely this apparent 
asymmetry.56 
 
When asymmetric leverage holds, we should also not expect to see maximalist demands from 
the aspirant. Contrary to tendencies for negotiators to make ‘extreme demands’ at the 
bargaining table,57 a loss-averse nuclear hedger would rather cooperate to defend its newly 
acquired leverage and its associated potential gains. Hence, demands should remain within 
the range it has been consistently claiming, reflecting perhaps its core interests or more 
urgent needs. Insofar as the adversary shows willingness to negotiate around the range, the 
aspirant should then yield on points considered to be secondary – including, in this case, 
potential advancements of its nuclear weapons program. Lastly, when negotiations or the 
outcome fall short of the aspirant’s demands, perceptions of loss are reconfirmed, and the 
aspirant should reinitiate nuclear development in a bid to ‘break even’.58 
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In all, if the causal logic of asymmetric leveraging holds then we should observe the 
following. First, increase in the aspirant’s bargaining leverage based upon its adversary’s 
willingness to concede first, and the former’s assessment that the latter would be willing to 
yield to its central demands. Having recognized the asymmetric leverage, the aspirant should 
largely shift its focus from defending its deterrence force towards concluding a deal and 
attaining its potential outcomes. Second, in the case that its central demands are formally 
acceded to, the aspirant should make explicit commitments demonstrating changes in its 
policy from proliferation to restraint. That said, because loss aversion represents a behavioral 
trait that accompanies a heightened sensitivity towards losses, we should also observe a quick 
re-initiation of proliferation activities or the lack of cooperation from the aspirant when its 
leverage appears to diminish in order to compensate for intermediary losses. This should not 
come as a surprise if the causal logic based on loss aversion is in play. That is, what is not yet 
acquired – a successful deal and adherence to its central demands – should not be expected to 
be defended as strongly as what the aspirant already owns and is putting at risk. 
 
North Korean Case Studies 
To test the arguments of asymmetric leveraging presented above, we analyze the conditions 
under which North Korea adopted a policy of nuclear restraint in the post-Cold War era – the 
1994 Agreed Framework and the Six-Party Talks. The North Korean nuclear issue is perhaps 
the biggest threat to the nonproliferation regime in the post-Cold War era and serves as a 
crucial case for our study. Unlike existing works in prospect theory that investigates the close 
relationship between changes in domain and risk propensity, we start with the assumption 
that aspirants are always in the domain of loss and primarily focus on analyzing the shifts in 




that led to Pyongyang’s adoption of the nuclear restraining policy. We use process-tracing to 
infer and test the causal process while maintaining a high level of conceptual validity.59 In the 
process, we further elaborate the antecedent variables and necessary conditions that led to the 
adoption of nuclear restraining behavior in the international system.60 Our goal is to be 
‘descriptively accurate’ in our case studies, ‘which can in turn enrich explanatory and 
descriptive goals’.61 
 
US-North Korea 1994 Agreed Framework 
Nuclear Hedging and the First Nuclear Crisis (1991-94) 
Washington’s overall relationship with Pyongyang can broadly be summarized as one mired 
in hostility and isolation for the latter.62 After the first US deliberations on the use of atomic 
bombs during the Korean War,63 no other country since ‘has been the target of more 
American [compellent] nuclear threats than North Korea’.64 Even after ‘engagement replaced 
containment of China [in the early 1970s], the DPRK remained the target of containment’.65 
Serious efforts to develop an indigenous program began in earnest during the Cold War 
period after doubts around the Soviet Union’s economic and military assistance arose and 
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South Korean plans to acquire its own nuclear capabilities were uncovered.66 Thus, despite 
limited means and materials,67 North Korea pushed forth with nuclear research and 
development, having in operation a 5-megawatt reactor by 1986.68 
 
When Russia and China moved towards rapprochement with South Korea in the 1990s, once 
reliable pillars of support furthermore ceased to exist for North Korea and ‘the balance of 
power … shifted in [South Korea’s] favor’.69 These events sent a ‘transformative shock’ 
throughout Pyongyang as the systemic shift in the geopolitical situation accentuated existing 
regional threats (for instance, US-ROK and US-Japan alliances) with limited time for 
adjustments.70 At this juncture, signs of North Korea’s hedging strategy became increasingly 
apparent as statements expressing Pyongyang’s intent to establish a nuclear weapons program 
began to emerge, shortly after it agreed to sign the NPT in December 1985.71 
 
However, following the withdrawal of American tactical nuclear weapons from the Korean 
peninsula in the early 1990s, the relationship between North and South Korea thawed, 
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manifesting in the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.72 This 
willingness to negotiate denuclearization for diplomatic normalization with the US and its 
regional allies has continuously served as Pyongyang’s basic foreign policy line. In fact, 
normalization of relations, an end to US nuclear threats, and a peace treaty to officially end 
the Korean War remain North Korea’s fundamental demands since the 1970s.73 Yet 
Pyongyang’s demands have often been disregarded: ‘[s]enior officials in the [George] Bush 
and the [Bill] Clinton Administrations were themselves skeptical that diplomacy could 
succeed. Given the doubt and hostility in Congress and in the foreign policy establishment, 
both administrations were loath to try’. 74 
 
The final straw leading to the first nuclear crisis, however, was the IAEA demand for ‘special 
inspections’ in the light of discrepancy between its analysis of North Korea’s nuclear 
development and that declared by Pyongyang.75 Against the backdrop of the resumed joint 
US-ROK (Republic of Korea) military exercise, Team Spirit, and Pyongyang’s perception 
that the IAEA was being unfair, North Korea undertook an even harder stance on self-
defense. Eventually, Pyongyang ‘declared its intention to withdraw from the NPT’, which 
finally prompted the international community, and especially the US, to engage with it 
formally in ‘high-level talks’.76 Nevertheless, even as withdrawal discussions were taking 
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place, DPRK made sure not to exceed the threshold towards nuclear weaponization.77 
Evidently, Pyongyang was adopting a hedging strategy in order to mitigate its position of 
disadvantage and provide itself with abilities to defend its interests, which were so often 
dismissed by the broader community. 
 
Asymmetric Leveraging and the 1994 Agreed Framework 
The high-level talks culminated in the US-DPRK Joint Statement, which was regarded by 
Pyongyang as a ‘historic’ agreement. The US ‘promised not to use force (including nuclear 
weapons) against North Korea, to respect its sovereignty, and not to interfere in its internal 
affairs’.78 For Pyongyang, the apparent move toward normalization was deemed such an 
achievement that despite its initial unwillingness to discuss the suspension of its NPT 
withdrawal, it unilaterally proceeded to doing so. 
 
Still, crisis once again escalated following President Clinton’s contemplation of military 
options, evident in his examination of the United States Forces Korea (USFK)’s defense 
posture, and the Pentagon’s consideration of a potential air strike on North Korea’s 
Yongbyon nuclear facility.79 By June 1994, sanctions were ordered and threats were so rife 
that goods sold out in grocery stores as South Koreans prepared for a potential war.80 
However, war was averted as then ROK President Young-sam Kim was opposed to the use of 
military force and Clinton was deterred when told the war could sacrifice 1 million lives – 
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including more than 50,000 Americans – approximately $100 billion and another $1,000 
billion due to interference to the global and regional economies.81 
 
As tension continued to heighten, Clinton finally sanctioned Jimmy Carter’s visit to North 
Korea to discuss a ‘peaceful resolution’ to the ongoing nuclear crisis.82 The former president 
was warmly welcomed as it marked a departure from traditional US reluctance on high-level 
talks despite Pyongyang’s preference for bilateral negotiations.83 In addition to assuring Kim 
Il-sung that the US had no intentions of initiating nuclear attacks against North Korea, Carter 
publicly affirmed that the US had ceased efforts to pursue sanctions – a direct contradiction 
of the Clinton administration’s North Korea policy. In the words of the then US negotiators, 
the press was already peppered with ‘[negativity], suggesting [the administration’s] weakness 
and vacillation in the face of imminent sanctions’ by the day after Carter’s visit.84 However, 
‘Carter’s pledge that he would urge the Clinton administration to negotiate with Pyongyang 
was highly validating to Kim.’85 
 
North Korea had all the reasons to believe that the bargaining leverage had moved in its favor 
given the changes in US position to Pyongyang’s various demands, and the ensuing fait 
accompli diplomatic stance. As such, to the extent that nuclear hedgers are inclined to defend 
against potential losses, Pyongyang had all the incentives to recognize and prevent the loss of 
this newfound leverage. As Carter acknowledged, ‘the North Koreans emphasized that they 
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wanted peaceful relations with the United States and their neighbors … a peace treaty … and 
to end the economic sanctions that has been very damaging to them’ every time they met.86 
Moreover, Kim immediately agreed to Carter’s request to assist in recovering the remains of 
American soldiers from the Korean War, to permit IAEA supervision and to pursue a mutual 
agreement with the US regarding the peace treaty. Pyongyang even agreed to not restart the 
5-megawatt reactor, which was an added precondition by the US to ‘raise the bar [higher than 
where Carter] had set it’.87 Effectively, beyond not being able to separate plutonium – 
America’s original precondition for negotiations – North Korea could not even produce such 
materials in the interim.88 
 
To emphasize, nuclear hedging behavior remained evident throughout the negotiation 
process. For instance, despite the Joint Statement of July 1993, Robert Gallucci, then chief 
negotiator with North Korea, recalls that Pyongyang ‘deliberately did’ all that the US warned 
them not to. Rather than facilitate IAEA’s inspection, North Korea ‘shuffled the fuel 
elements… so that the possibility of eventually reconstructing a reactor operating history was 
destroyed’.89 Hence, all these preliminary and especially unilateral concessions, which were 
absent in 1993, should be regarded as each side’s devotion towards diplomacy that arguably 
contributed to the quick return to negotiations by July 1994. 
 
Kim Il-sung’s dedication towards diplomacy continued to bear upon the trajectory of the 
negotiations after his death. As commentators noted, Kim Jong-il, the successor to Kim Il-
sung, had the added responsibility of completing the latter’s ‘last wish’ because ‘[n]o one 
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could disobey the will of the dying patriarch, especially in such a traditional society’.90 
Furthermore, ‘[t]he North Korean media also emphasized that denuclearization was “the 
dying wish [yuhun] of Supreme Leader Kim Il-sung”’.91 Thus, failing to conclude a deal 
could result more so in a political suicide for the younger Kim than a boost to his legitimacy. 
Kim Jong-il soon made clear his position to ‘honor the promises by his father’ and 
negotiations resumed after a temporary pause.92 
 
In October 1994, the US and North Korea finally signed the grand bargain – the Agreed 
Framework. On the one hand, North Korea agreed to restrain by freezing its Yongbyon 
plutonium production facilities and permitting IAEA inspection. On the other hand, the US 
guaranteed to not use nuclear weapons against North Korea, establish diplomatic 
representation in Pyongyang, loosen existing economic sanctions, and provide North Korea 
with $4 billion worth of ‘proliferation-resistant’ light-water reactors and a 10-year supply of 
heavy fuel oil.93  
 
Economically, the generous financial aid via sanctions relief and energy assistance was 
timely given North Korea’s dire economic situation in the 1990s.94 Security-wise, while 
negative nuclear security guarantees were not new in the US-DPRK nuclear discussions, ‘the 
Agreed Framework committed the US publicly and formally to not using or threatening to 
use nuclear weapons against the DPRK’; that is, it implied the ‘permanent suspension of the 
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‘Team Spirit’’.95 Politically, in order to normalize relations, the US further offered to open 
diplomatic and political channels with North Korea.96 Arrangements to exchange low-level 
diplomatic offices were also made and this move proved vital as diplomatic exchanges such 
as Carter’s visit and Washington’s agreement to open liaison offices were regarded by North 
Korea as a demonstration of US commitment toward the deal.97 
 
The terms of the deal affirm the final attribute of the asymmetric leverage argument. North 
Korea officially shifted to a policy of nuclear restraint only when the US formally agreed to 
satisfy its central and urgent demands: Pyongyang’s need for economic assistance and 
security reassurances, and its desire for a normalization of US-North Korean relations.98 In 
evidence, Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of North Korea’s ruling party, ‘published a 
full text of the accord as well as President Bill Clinton’s separate letter of assurance to Kim 
Jong-il on its front page’ to publicize the country’s ‘major victory’.99  
 
Unrealized Goals and Return to Nuclear Proliferation 
Signing of the Agreed Framework was not risk-free for North Korea. Most evidently, while 
the DPRK delegation had asked for the deal to be legally binding, the US representatives 
managed at best to produce a ‘beefed-up political guarantee’. In effect, this guarantee is but 
an ‘impressive’ sounding phrase which, in legal terms, suggests that ‘the president was not 
committing the U.S. government beyond the scope of his constitutional powers’.100 Plainly 
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put, North Korea was, to some extent, betting on the US’s good faith to reap its long desired 
rewards.101 
 
Moreover, even though the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) 
was established to finance the light water reactors and implement several other aspects of the 
agreement, these promises to North Korea remained unmaterialized.102 Members to KEDO 
struggled to agree on the cost structure and the implementation process as none was ready to 
commit to the $4.6 million project. By 1998, debts amounted to $50 million and five years 
lapsed before KEDO would sign a contract with a South Korean power corporation to 
construct the agreed light water reactors.103 Meanwhile, the US provided little leadership to 
smoothen the process. Not only did Congress exercise its influence over public expenditure to 
delay both the delivery of fuel oil and reactors but the president’s power to fund KEDO 
through national security waiver was also lost to an amendment restricting US-North Korea 
nuclear cooperation.104 Aggravated by deteriorating US-DPRK relations due to the Bush 
administration’s preference for tougher policies, North Korea re-operated its Yongbyon 
facility and the Agreed Framework effectively ended in the early 2000s.105 
 
Six-Party Talks 
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Path to the Second Nuclear Crisis 
The second nuclear crisis was sparked in October 2002, amid U.S. intelligence reports 
indicating the existence of a clandestine highly enriched uranium (HEU) weapons program in 
North Korea. With the unwinding of the Agreed Framework, the international context had 
substantially been altered to heighten Pyongyang’s sense of insecurity. The newly 
inaugurated Bush administration wanted to chart a vastly different course from his 
predecessor. Grounded in skepticisms of North Korea, Washington shunned bilateral political 
dialogue and approached the nuclear issue more ‘resolutely and decisively’.106 Sentiments for 
a tougher policy towards DPRK were similarly echoed among the Republican Party 
leaders.107 Moreover, following the 9/11 terror attacks, North Korea was now designated as 
part of the ‘axis of evil’, rogue states that posed immediate threats to the US and its regional 
allies.108 The Bush Doctrine and the notion that preventive war could ultimately lead to 
‘another Iraq’ had altered Pyongyang’s reference point towards the need for a strong 
deterrence once again.109 
 
Intent on fulfilling its core demands of diplomatic normalization with and security guarantees 
from the US, North Korea desired and pushed for the resumption of the Agreed Framework 
through bilateral discussions.110 Such overtures were rebuffed and the US, instead, called for 
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complete nuclear disarmament ahead of any substantive negotiations. Kim Jong-il’s regime 
responded by undoing the core vestiges of the 1994 Agreed Framework. Given the evolving 
state of the international realm, returning to the status quo under the existing Agreed 
Framework was, thus, unacceptable to Pyongyang as the conditions outlined were ‘not 
sufficient to provide for either the regime’s security concerns or its energy needs’.111 
Subsequently, North Korea’s attitude began to harden as it began placing greater emphasis on 
‘its right to develop nuclear weapons programs’.112 
 
Under the politics of songun (a ‘strong and powerful country’), nuclear weapons program 
served a variety of domestic roles for Kim’s regime.113 But most importantly, North Korea 
desired a ‘powerful physical deterrent force’ against the US that would be economically 
feasible and able to offset its conventional inferiority.114 Pyongyang’s nuclear policy was best 
captured by Li Gun, then North Korean director general for American affairs: ‘with the Bush 
administration putting an end to bilateral political dialogue, its “axis of evil” pronouncement, 
and defining North Korea as a target of preemptive nuclear strike, the nuclear question has 
come back to the starting point’.115  
 
Without guarantees from the US, North Korea continued its hedging strategy in the lead-up to 
the Six-Party Talks and ‘chose to heighten its bargaining leverage while willing to bear the 
                                                          
111 Moreover, with North Korea having broken its side of the bargain also provided the early basis for US 
insistence on CVID. James Cotton, ‘North Korea and the Six-Party Process: Is a Multilateral Resolution of the 
Nuclear Issue Still Possible?’ Asian Security, 3:1 (2007), p. 38. 
112 Former ambassador to ROK, Donald Gregg, recalls in his 2002 meeting with DPRK General Ri Chan-bok 
stating his concerns of potential US attacks on North Korea. Hur, The Six-Party Talks on North Korea, p. 107-8. 
113 Habib, ‘North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Programme and the Maintenance of the Songun System’ Pacific 
Review, 24: 1 (2011), pp. 56-9. Also, see Seongji Woo, ‘Pyongyang and the World: North Korean Perspectives 
on International Relations under Kim Jong-il’, Pacific Focus, 26:2 (2011), pp. 192-3. 
114 Jae-Bong Lee, ‘US-Deployment of Nuclear Weapons in 1950s South Korea & North Korea’s Nuclear 
Development: Toward Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula’, Asia-Pacific Journal – Japan Focus, 7:3 
(2009), p. 14; Pollack, No Exit, p. 144; and Victor Cha, ‘North Korea’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: Badges, 
Shields, or Swords?’ Political Science Quarterly, 117:2 (2002), pp. 29-30. 




political and diplomatic cost of being brandished as a ‘defiant state’’.116 Even while admitting 
its nuclear production in October 2002, Kang Suk Joo, First Vice Foreign Minister, ‘claimed 
that North Korea was willing to abandon its nuclear program should U.S.-DPRK ties are 
completely normalized, and until that time it will continue to demand compensation for the 
freezing of its nuclear program’.117  
 
Asymmetric Leveraging and the Six-Party Talks 
As new tensions escalated rapidly between the US and DPRK, a trilateral meeting was 
organized by China in early 2003.118 The negotiations were soon expanded to include South 
Korea, Japan and Russia, reflecting ‘the Bush administration's view that the [North Korean] 
nuclear issue was a “neighborhood problem”’.119 From the outset of the Six-Party talks in 
August 2003, the US displayed an uncompromising stance towards the DPRK, which Wang 
Yi, then Chinese Vice Minister, noted: ‘[t]he American policy towards DPRK – this is the 
main problem we are facing’.120 In other words, the US approached negotiations from a 
position of strength and, buttressed by its belief in North Korean collapsism, was willing to 
pressure Pyongyang and take its time. As such, negotiations assumed ‘a primarily tactical 
role rather than a wholehearted effort to engage the DPRK’.121 
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Second round of negotiations the following year did not result in much progress and 
Washington began to shift its focus towards the issue of CVID (Complete, Verifiable and 
Irreversible Dismantlement), while intensifying its baseline negotiating stance.122 Vice 
President Dick Cheney insisted on hard language in any potential joint statement while 
President Bush ‘highlighted the implication that all options were still on the table’ during his 
March 2004 interview with The Washington Post.123 Other senior US officials in the Bush 
administration continued to advocate a tough policy towards North Korea,124 and the US 
‘sought to apply multilateral pressures to isolate, contain, and transform North Korea through 
sanctions and related measures’.125 
 
Portrayed as ‘an outpost of tyranny’ and Kim Jong-il as an ‘irresponsible leader’ by US 
officials, Pyongyang perceived diplomatic overtures as signs of insincerity and ‘left many 
observers puzzled as to the likely next steps’.126 As US pressures intensified, Pyongyang 
remained flexible in its approach and consistently probed for terms that would see its 
adversary bear the heavier costs. As a senior North Korean official noted, nuclear 
development was part of a plan ‘to force Bush to negotiate on terms more favorable to North 
Korea’.127 By the end of the third round, it was clear that both sides were approaching the 
Six-Party negotiations with maximalist demands. North Korea demanded security assurances 
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and other compensatory measures in exchange for complete denuclearization while the US 
regarded CVID as a prerequisite for the initiation of any serious discussions.128  
 
With both sides unable to narrow the gap, negotiations reached a deadlock as the US did not 
budge from its initial position, that is, to normalize relations with a rogue state only after 
North Korea had completely denuclearized.129 Pyongyang, instead, continued its hedging 
strategy by engaging with the Six-Party Talks while continuing with its nuclear development. 
Even as diplomacy was at a standstill in February 2005, ‘Kim Jong Il reiterated to Wang 
Jiarui, Minister of the International Department of the Chinese Communist Party, that he had 
no intention of withdrawing from the Talks’.130 Yet, at the same time, the North Korean lead 
negotiator for the Six-Party Talks declared North Korea to be ‘a dignified nuclear weapons 
possessing state’ and, as such, demanded discussions to focus on bilateral arms control 
negotiations.131 Indicatively, the costs of North Korean denuclearization, in Pyongyang’s 
view, had shifted and became much more expensive for the negotiating counterpart by this 
stage. 
 
In July 2005, new rounds of talks commenced, after a year-long absence, largely through the 
efforts of Christopher Hill, then the assistant secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs at the 
State Department. By this time, the US adopted a much more conciliatory approach and 
attempted to engage North Korea in order to determine the boundaries for further action.132 
During round four talks, the North Korean representatives continued to argue for its right to 
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develop peaceful nuclear capability and insisted on the light-water reactor requirement as a 
way ‘to overemphasize Pyongyang’s early (going-in) negotiating position’.133 After several 
delays and other holdups, talks would ultimately result in the September 19 Joint 
Statement.134 Despite both sides agreeing to several overarching goals, such as abandonment 
of nuclear weapons and return to the NPT, much of the substance remained vague in terms of 
timeline and sequencing.135 Consequently, Pyongyang and Washington were ‘interpreting the 
agreement according to their own predilections that unfortunately ‘resembled a multilateral 
version of the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework’.136 
 
The Joint Statement was not a planned proposal for North Korea to denuclearize or for 
Pyongyang to stop its hedging strategy for the foreseeable future. Consequently, North Korea 
took an even firmer stance on negotiations during the fifth round of the Six-Party talks. For 
instance, the spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs highlighted that denuclearization 
meant the whole Korean peninsula rather than just DPRK and emphasized that the joint 
statement from the previous round ‘started precisely from the principled position of 
denuclearisation through the normalisation of relations, not the normalisation of relations 
through denuclearisation’.137 Efforts to hammer out the details of the initial joint statement in 
the last minutes ultimately fell short. Insistence on denuclearization prior to normalization did 
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not sit well with Pyongyang. As such, it did not see itself bound by any arms limitation 
agreement and continued with nuclear hedging.138 
 
Ultimately, negotiations reached a stalemate as the US Treasury Department imposed 
sanctions on Banco Delta Asia (BDA), a bank in Macau that was suspected of counterfeiting, 
which led to the freezing of ‘$25 million of North Korea’s funds’.139 These sanctions were 
perceived by North Korea ‘as a clear sign of U.S. hostility’ and had urged Pyongyang to 
move ahead with missile and nuclear tests.140 Weeks after North Korea’s first partially 
successful nuclear tests in 2006, its chief negotiator, Kim Gye Gwan, and Ambassador Hill 
held a face-to-face meeting in China. This long-sought-after meeting is significant for it 
signaled to North Korea the US’s ‘respect for North Korea’s legitimacy’. Moreover, contrary 
to the White House’s insistence on not having bilateral arrangements with North Korea, Hill 
‘agreed to create a bilateral working group’ to resolve the BDA issue. To reciprocate the 
US’s apparent concession, North Korea returned to the negotiation table.141 
 
In January 2007, a separate Kim-Hill meeting took place in Berlin outside the framework of 
the Six-Party talks. Immediately following the meeting, Hill stated that the US was willing to 
engage DPRK in a ‘bilateral process’ and prepared to ‘really offer North Korea a hand as it 
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moves along the road’; through Hill’s comments, ‘for the first time, the U.S. would engage in 
direct bilateral talks with the DPRK, as Pyongyang has long demanded’.142 Specifically, 
promises to unfreeze North Korean assets at BDA during the Berlin meetings were critical in 
that they displayed not only the US’s willingness to negotiate bilaterally but also save ‘face 
for North Korea and signaled a change of U.S. hostile policy toward the Kim Jong Il 
regime’.143 Subsequently, Washington finally accepted Pyongyang’s demand for ‘sequenced 
actions-for-actions’ and showed willingness to acquiesce to Pyongyang’s demands of a front-
loaded economic reward structure.144 With the February 2007 Beijing agreement, North 
Korea announced that ‘each side agreed on temporary suspension of the nuclear facilities [in 
Yongbyon and Taechon], and provision of energy equivalent to 1 million tons of heavy 
oil’.145 Furthermore, North Korea agreed, amongst other things, to dismantle vital nuclear 
facilities which would ‘not only make [restarting its nuclear program] difficult, but also … 
expensive’.146 In return, bilateral talks were set to continue between Washington and 
Pyongyang, and five working groups were due to be established to implement plans for the 
‘denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, DPRK-US normalization, DPRK-Japan 
normalization, economy and energy cooperation, and Northeast Asia Peace and Security 
Mechanism’.147 The two-phase agreement itself was significant as Pyongyang signaled to the 
US and the international community that it was willing to take the necessary physical steps 
for the first time to halt the production of weapons-grade material. Upon successful 
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completion of the agreement, the reconstitution of North Korea’s plutonium production 
would have been considerably much more difficult and consume more than 12 months. 
Furthermore, despite Pyongyang’s dissatisfaction with the tardy delivery of promises in the 
beginning of 2008, it remained to be a cooperative partner in the implementation phase at 
least up until the middle of the year. Delegates from the US and DPRK reached a 
compromise regarding the details of North Korea’s declaration on its nuclear capabilities; and 
Pyongyang submitted an approximately 18,000-page report that details the operations of its 
facilities in Yongbyon, and later, a ‘package of items’ which acknowledged the Washington’s 
‘concerns about the DPRK’s uranium enrichment and nuclear proliferation activities’ 
amongst other things.148 In all, the 2007 Beijing agreement achieved results that are largely 
consistent with the minimum goal of keeping Pyongyang’s nuclear program in check. 
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Failure and Nuclear Advancements 
Yet differences on the verification procedure proved to be incompatible as North Korea, after 
rounds of intensive discussions, argued that ‘disablement did not imply dismantlement’ and 
refused ‘any commitment to written, binding pledges on verification’.149 Pyongyang felt that 
the steps towards dismantlement displayed in ‘good faith’, such as blowing up of the 5MWe 
reactor cooling tower and allowing IAEA inspectors back into Yongbyon, had not been 
reciprocated.150 The US had shifted its initial policy and requested for a stronger verification 
regime to oversee the dismantlement process in exchange for the removal of North Korea 
from its terrorism list.151 Needless to say, Pyongyang felt that it was deceived in the process 
and that the Bush administration was clearly not willing to shoulder the costs of peaceful 
dismantlement. By this point, the Six-Party talks was pretty much over. Overtures for the 
continuation of multilateral dialogue made by the next administration were turned down as 
‘Kim Jong Il… called the new administration ‘hostile’ and ‘unchanged’ from the Bush 
era’.152 
  
In all, the Six-Party Talks did manage to accomplish more than the 1994 Agreed Framework 
in terms of engaging North Korea with the process of denuclearization, such as its core 
facilities and reactors at Yongbyon and Taechon.153 However, it ultimately failed in pushing 
North Korea towards, at minimum, a sustained nuclear restraint policy. The ‘uncoordinated’ 
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and ‘abruptly’ imposed BDA sanctions undermined the action-for-action process to fully put 
North Korea on a path of denuclearization.154 Inter-Korean relations around this period also 
soured when the incoming conservative Lee Myung-bak government adopted a tougher 
policy line towards its neighbors, and Washington’s passive diplomacy in Northeast Asia was 
lacking urgency in dealing with North Korean nuclear issues.155 Moreover, a crisis of 
succession with Kim Jong-il’s deteriorating health led to a re-emphasis of the importance of 
nuclear deterrence by Pyongyang in order to ‘reaffirm the loyalty of key stakeholders as the 
leadership dealt with the succession challenge’.156 
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Like policies aimed towards nuclearization, the decision to forego it is a costly and 
contentious endeavor, and it oftentimes ends up being a long-drawn-out process. Yet, nuclear 
hedgers have displayed a willingness to restrain their nuclear policies in the post-Cold War 
era. To understand the strategic decision-making process under which nuclear aspirants 
accept the terms of nonproliferation, we have outlined two interrelated necessary conditions 
based on the insights of prospect theory. First, a nuclear hedger must perceive itself as 
holding a greater leverage than its adversary. Owing to loss aversion, a state that chooses to 
adopt a nuclear hedging strategy would be particularly sensitive to losses and thus, the 
tendency would be to hold on to its initial position. Consequently, a shift away from this 
initial reference point, which originally underpinned nuclear proliferation, will only occur 
when its adversary concedes first.  
 
If the first condition deals with shifts in reference points, the second deals with the nuclear 
aspirant’s tendency to remain on the reversal pathway. The nuclear aspirant will explicitly 
commit to a restraining policy during negotiations and work towards concluding a successful 
deal if its adversary also agrees to yield to its core demands. It is only when these minimum 
conditions are satisfied that nuclear aspirants will shift its initial reference point and undergo 
changes towards nuclear nonproliferation. However, remaining on the nuclear reversal 
pathway should not necessarily rule out the continuation of hedging strategy. On the contrary, 
nuclear hedging by loss-averse aspirants can continue even when on the nuclear reversal 
pathway because it would seek to do its best to compensate for intermediary losses.  
 
An in-depth study of North Korea’s nuclear policy provides support for our asymmetric 




Korea’s nuclear weapons program in the post-Cold War era have been frustrated countless 
times and have fallen short on numerous occasions. Yet, a closer examination of the pathway 
reveals that North Korea has shifted its nuclear policy towards nuclear restraint in the past. 
During negotiations around the 1994 Agreed Framework, Pyongyang accepted to restrain its 
nuclear weapons program only when the US formally agreed to satisfy its central and urgent 
demands of security and economic assurances and diplomatic normalization. The Six-Party 
Talks initially proved to be more problematic as both the US and DPRK held on to 
maximalist demands. Yet, the Beijing Agreement in 2007 was finally concluded when the US 
displayed a willingness to acquiesce to Pyongyang’s demands and shoulder the costs of 
denuclearization. In both cases, the loss-averse hedger, North Korea, shifted its nuclear policy 
from deterrence to restraint only when it held asymmetric leverage over its adversary. 
Moreover, once its reference point had shifted, the aspirant explicitly committed to the 
nuclear agreements until it felt that the bargaining leverage had disappeared.  
 
Finally, the theoretical and policy implications that follow from our research are threefold. 
First, hedging strategy is not necessarily abandoned with the commencement of negotiations. 
As our case studies demonstrate, hedging continues to occur even during negotiations, which 
means, one should not expect North Korea, or any other nuclear aspirants, to exercise 
complete restraint throughout the whole negotiation period. In the lead-up to the Trump-Kim 
summit, Pyongyang, through its official news agency, continued to criticize the US approach 
and warned against taking its conciliatory posture as signs of North Korea’s weakness or that 
it was willing to denuclearize.157 Yet, North Korea has simultaneously displayed a preference 
for nuclear restraint policy as Kim Jong-un publicly claimed that it would not proliferate its 
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nuclear technology and made ‘an unprecedented offer’ as soon as Washington agreed last 
October to ‘put the end-of-war declaration on the negotiating table’.158 With security 
concerns still dominating North Korea’s national discourse,159  Pyongyang, as Carlin points 
out, needs to be certain about the US’s ‘own commitment, [or] they will pursue hedging’.160 
While hedging continues our theoretical explanation also expects North Korea to stay within 
the lines of restraint so long as the US refrains from undertaking punitive actions and the 
prospect of attaining Pyongyang’s goals remains practicable.161 
  
Second, conceptually linking hedging strategy to restraining policy helps us better understand 
the whole process of nuclear proliferation and provides policymakers with a full spectrum of 
options in dealing with future nuclear aspirants, rather than a narrow hardline stance that the 
US and the international community have undertaken in the past. For instance, it has recently 
been noted that reassurance strategy serves as a valuable yet distinct means through which a 
nuclear state can signal nonaggressive intention to aspirants.162 Our study supports this claim 
and shows that there exist varieties of reassurance strategies within the nuclear reversal 
framework.  
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